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ABSTRACT 
Having an accurate sense of the spatial boundaries of the body is a prerequisite for 
interacting with the environment and is thus essential for the survival of any organism with 
a central nervous system. Every second, our brain receives a staggering amount of 
information from the body across different sensory channels, each of which features a 
certain degree of noise. Despite the complexity of the incoming multisensory signals, the 
brain manages to construct and maintain a stable representation of our own body and its 
spatial relationships to the external environment. This natural “in-body” experience is such 
a fundamental subjective feeling that most of us take it for granted. However, patients with 
lesions in particular brain areas can experience profound disturbances in their normal sense 
of ownership over their body (somatoparaphrenia) or lose the feeling of being located 
inside their physical body (out-of-body experiences), suggesting that our “in-body” experi-
ence depends on intact neural circuitry in the temporal, frontal, and parietal brain regions. 
The question at the heart of this thesis relates to how the brain combines visual, tactile, and 
proprioceptive signals to build an internal representation of the bodily self in space. 
Over the past two decades, perceptual body illusions have become an important tool for 
studying the mechanisms underlying our sense of body ownership and self-location. The 
most influential of these illusions is the rubber hand illusion, in which ownership of an 
artificial limb is induced via the synchronous stroking of a rubber hand and an individual’s 
hidden real hand. Studies of this illusion have shown that multisensory integration within 
the peripersonal space is a key mechanism for bodily self-attribution. In Study I, we 
showed that the default sense of ownership of one’s real hand, not just the sense of rubber 
hand ownership, also depends on spatial and temporal multisensory congruence principles 
implemented in fronto-parietal brain regions. In Studies II and III, we characterized two 
novel perceptual illusions that provide strong support for the notion that multisensory 
integration within the peripersonal space is intimately related to the sense of limb owner-
ship, and we examine the role of vision in this process. In Study IV, we investigated a full-
body version of the rubber hand illusion—the “out-of-body illusion”—and show that it can 
be used to induce predictable changes in one’s sense of self-location and body ownership. 
Finally, in Study V, we used the out-of-body illusion to “perceptually teleport” participants 
during brain imaging and identify activity patterns specific to the sense of self-location in a 
given position in space. Together, these findings shed light on the role of multisensory 
integration in building the experience of the bodily self in space and provide initial 
evidence for how representations of body ownership and self-location interact in the brain.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Listen,’ I said. ‘I don’t think you’re well. Please allow us to return you to bed. But I want 
to ask you one final question. If this—this leg—is not your left leg, then where is your own 
left leg?’ 
Once more he became pale—so pale that I thought he was going to faint. ‘I don’t know, he 
said. ‘I have no idea. It’s disappeared. It’s gone. It’s nowhere to be found…’ 
Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat 
 
The body is a unique object in the world. Not only do we have access to it via our external 
senses—i.e., we can see it, hear it, and sometimes even smell it—we also feel it from the 
inside. Sensory receptors in muscles, tendons and joints convey information to the brain 
about the positioning of our limbs. Receptors in the skin signal sensations of touch. 
Feelings such as thirst, hunger, and emotional pain are diffuse and hard to spatially localize 
to a specific body part, but we refer them to within the boundaries of our own body. Despite 
the richness of our bodily awareness, it has historically attracted substantially less attention 
from psychologists and philosophers compared to, for instance, visual awareness. One 
might speculate that this state of affairs is due to the difficulty of studying bodily 
awareness, which, unlike vision, is not under voluntary control and is constantly present. 
For instance, I cannot actively choose to stop sensing my left arm, and there is no moment 
in our everyday lives when we are completely unaware of our body – as William James 
eloquently put it, “we experience a warm and intimate feeling of the same old body always 
there” (James, 1890). To the experimental psychologist, not being able to “turn on and off” 
the mental phenomenon under investigation (such as hearing a sound versus not hearing a 
sound) constitutes a major disadvantage to studying that phenomenon, which might explain 
why the brain processes underlying bodily awareness have remained relatively unexplored. 
Another complicating factor is that bodily awareness is a rather complex phenomenon, 
featuring multiple different aspects, such as modality-specific sensations (touch, 
proprioception, vestibular, and pain), interception (sensing the internal state of the body), 
bodily emotions (e.g., hunger, thirst, and tiredness), agency (the feeling of being in control 
of one’s actions), spatial self-perception (“where am I?”), and body ownership (“what am 
I?”). Because it is usually wise to start with trying to understand something simple at the 
 6 
heart of a complex problem, this thesis aimed at characterizing the brain processes that 
underlie two basic aspects of bodily awareness: the feeling that the body belongs to the self 
(body ownership) and the sense of being located somewhere in space (self-location). 
1.1 IS THERE A FEELING OF BODY OWNERSHIP? 
When looking at our hands, we immediately recognize them as our own hands. The term 
“body ownership” refers to the feeling that the body belongs to the self. With the 
development of several paradigms of perceptual body illusions over the past two decades 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008), bodily self-perception has become a lively research topic in experimental 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. However, before delving into the neuroscientific 
literature on body ownership, it might be prudent to first ask a more basic and philosophical 
question: is there a feeling of body ownership (sometimes referred to as “mineness,” e.g., 
de Vignemont, 2015) in addition to the judgement of body ownership? According to de 
Vignemont, there are three main standpoints – the eliminativist, the reductionist, and the 
irreductionist view (de Vignemont, 2015). The eliminativist view (e.g., Bermúdez, 2011) 
argues that there is no intrinsic feeling of ownership that goes beyond the experience of the 
mere physical properties of the body. According to this view, I am aware of my right hand 
belonging to me in the sense that I know it, not in the sense that I feel it. The existence of 
body ownership illusions such as the rubber hand illusion, in which healthy participants 
report feeling ownership of an artificial limb even while acknowledging that it is not 
actually part of their own body (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) (i.e., it is an illusion and not a 
delusion), provides a strong argument against this viewpoint. Conversely, there are cases of 
asomatognosia in which the patient lacks a feeling of ownership over their real limb but still 
acknowledges that it is indeed their own (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). This dissociation 
between feelings and judgements of ownership seem to suggest that there is an experiential 
component of body ownership that goes beyond the mere judgement of ownership (De 
Vignemont, 2007; Peacocke, 2014). This argues in favor of the irreductionist view, which 
suggests that feelings of ownership are irreducible (Gallagher, 2005), or the reductionist 
view, which suggests that feelings of ownership can be reduced to other bodily experiences 
(De Vignemont, 2007). 
The four most commonly held reductionist positions argue that feelings of ownership are 
grounded in (i) the sense of the spatial boundaries of one’s body within which one can feel 
sensations (Martin, 1995), (ii) the sense of agency (i.e., being in control) of the body 
(Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010), (iii) the affective sense of familiarity with one’s own body 
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(de Vignemont, 2015), or (iv) a multisensory representation of the body. Position (i) seems 
implausible because it predicts that we cannot refer sensations to non-corporeal objects 
such as tools – which, in fact, we can (Maravita and Iriki, 2004)—and that asomatognosic 
patients would not be able to refer bodily sensations to their disowned limb—which, in 
some cases, they may: 
Mr. S (addressing his doctor): ‘Don’t you see? This thing here [indicating his left arm]! 
The doctors have attached this tool to my body in order to help me move … but it’s 
completely useless and very painful. I asked the nurses several times to take it away and put 
it in the cupboard!’ (Maravita, 2008) 
In addition, the reported feelings of ownership of an artificial limb do not correlate well 
with recalibrations of our sense of limb position (Abdulkarim and Ehrsson, 2015; Rohde et 
al., 2011), which would be expected if ownership was entirely grounded in the spatial 
experience of one’s body. Position (ii) also appears unlikely given that the majority of 
paralyzed patients do not experience disownership of limbs that they are no longer in 
motoric control of. In addition, participants under certain conditions experience agency 
without ownership in the so-called moving rubber hand illusion (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 
2012; Tsakiris et al., 2006). Position (iii), which states that the feeling of ownership is an 
“affective feeling that highlights the significance of the body for the self” and is grounded 
in a specific type of body schema that emphasizes bodily protection (de Vignemont, 2015), 
seems somewhat more plausible. This reductionist account of ownership asserts that 
syndromes of body disownership, such as somatoparaphrenia, could be interpreted as a 
bodily version of Capgras syndrome. Capgras patients can typically visually recognize their 
spouse for instance, but they lack the affective response of seeing their loved one and 
therefore believe that he or she is an impostor (Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux, 1923). In this 
framework, disownership associated with somatoparaphrenia results from an intact 
somatosensory system in the absence of an adequate affective response, while the illusory 
ownership of an artificial hand reflects the projection of affective significance to an external 
object, which is made possible by “tricking” the somatosensory system using multisensory 
stimulation. The observation that threatening a self-attributed artificial hand activates our 
affective systems in the form of increased sweating (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003) and 
brain activity in the cortical circuits for pain anticipation and fear (Ehrsson et al., 2007; 
Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 2015a) supports an intimate relationship between 
reported sensations of body ownership and affective responses. The feeling of ownership of 
an artificial limb or full-body per se has consistently been associated with activity in 
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primarily non-affective brain regions, such as the premotor and posterior parietal cortices 
and the putamen (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Guterstam et al., 2015a; Petkova et al., 2011a), 
which could be interpreted as the dynamic updating of our “protective body schema” within 
this framework. However, this theory does not account for the fact that a mother holding 
her child does not experience the child’s body as her own body even though she probably 
assigns a great deal of affective significance to the child’s body and would perform 
automatic protective actions if the child’s body were subjected to a physical threat (e.g., an 
incoming projectile). This argument might speak against the view that ownership merely 
reflects the “affective coloring” of the experiences relating to an object. Finally, the 
reductionist position (iv) states that the feeling of body ownership is grounded in a 
multisensory representation of the body (Ehrsson, 2012), which is constructed and 
maintained according to specific principles of multisensory integration. Support for this 
model can be drawn from both the literature on neurological lesions, which shows that 
deficits in ownership and multisensory processing often co-occur and involve the same set 
of brain regions (Blanke et al., 2004; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009), and the vast body of 
research on ownership illusions, which has demonstrated that feelings of owning an 
artificial limb are determined by basic multisensory congruence rules (Botvinick and 
Cohen, 1998; Stein and Stanford, 2008). As the remainder of this thesis will demonstrate, 
the multisensory hypothesis is strongly supported by experimental data related to the 
process of attributing real and artificial limbs to the self. 
However, we can experience ownership of our body even in the absence of multisensory 
integration, for instance, in cases when the brain only has access to sensory information 
from a single modality (e.g., when we have our eyes closed and receive no tactile input, 
relying solely on proprioception) or no sensory input at all (an amputee experiencing a 
phantom limb). Thus, the feeling of body ownership cannot be reduced to multisensory 
integration per se. Instead, these ownership sensations must emerge from an internal 
multisensory representation of the body that is continuously updated via integration 
processes and that is maintained even when integration is not actively taking place. A 
strength of this hypothesis is its simplicity and strong empirical support. However, for this 
model to explain, for instance, why we do not experience bodily ownership over tools, one 
needs to stipulate a “test-to-fit” criterion specifying that the multisensory body 
representation only incorporates body-like objects (Tsakiris, 2010). This ad hoc hypothesis 
reduces the explanatory value of the multisensory model because it appears to partly 
assume its conclusion. 
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In summary, feelings of body ownership cannot be easily reduced to other bodily 
experiences while still accounting for all of the special cases of limb ownership and 
disownership described in the neurological and neuropsychological literature. However, 
regardless of whether body ownership is an irreducible feeling or, perhaps, is reducible to a 
genuine multisensory percept or sense of affective significance, the enterprise of examining 
its underlying neural mechanisms, which sometimes involves asking participants to rate 
their subjective feelings of body ownership, remains meaningful. In the following sections I 
will summarize the neuropsychological, neurological, and neuroscientific attempts to 
answer the following questions: What makes us feel that our body is our own? How does 
this feeling relate to our sense of self-location? To understand how the brain represents the 
body and its spatial context, a good start is to review the basic neurophysiological research 
on “multisensory integration,” which has heavily influenced the modern study of perception 
in general and bodily self-consciousness in particular. 
1.2 MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION 
Sensory processing and perception has long been studied in both psychology and 
neuroscience. Historically, most studies have focused on investigating one sensory 
modality at a time (e.g., vision, touch, hearing, or proprioception). However, situations in 
our everyday lives often stimulate multiple sensory modalities at the same time. For 
instance, we both see and feel a glass of water in our hand, and both see and hear a tennis 
ball hitting a garage door. Although our sensory systems convey a staggering amount of 
information—both signal and noise—to our brain, it manages to filter out the noise and 
integrate subsets of signals from different senses to create meaningful percepts of our body 
and the external world. The term multisensory integration refers to the mechanisms by 
which the brain merges information across sensory modalities to enhance the salience 
(“perceptual importance”) of biologically meaningful events (Stein and Stanford, 2008). 
Until relatively recently, the mechanisms by which the brain accomplishes this feat were 
largely unknown. However, in the 1980s, neurophysiologists Barry Stein and Alex 
Meredith characterized the first multisensory neurons in cats in their pioneering studies of 
the deep layer of the superior colliculus, which is a structure in the posterior mesencephalon 
that is involved in guiding eye movements. Although earlier experiments had found 
neurons that responded to multiple sensory modalities (Bastian, 1982; Stein and Arigbede, 
1972), Stein & Meredith identified neurons that not only responded to multisensory stimuli 
but also integrated cross-modal signals in a very specific manner. The response of these 
neurons to visual and auditory stimuli greatly exceeded the sum of the responses to each 
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sensory modality alone provided that the stimuli occurred within a specific temporal 
window and that they originated from approximately the same region of external space 
(Meredith and Stein, 1983). This response property was referred to as superadditivity, and it 
is now considered a hallmark of multisensory integration because it provides a neuronal 
mechanism by which the brain enhances the salience of biologically meaningful events 
(Driver and Noesselt, 2008; Stein and Stanford, 2008). 
Over the years, multisensory neurons have been identified in multiple species, including 
non-human primates (Avillac et al., 2005, 2007) and humans (Sereno and Huang, 2006). As 
a general rule, it has been shown that the signals from two sensory modalities are much 
more likely to be integrated if they occur within a specific time window and if they 
originate from the same region of the body or external space. These two principles are 
commonly referred to the spatial and temporal rules of multisensory integration (Stein and 
Stanford, 2008). Together with the rule of inverse effectiveness, which states that the 
magnitude of multisensory integration is proportionally the greatest when the cross-modal 
stimuli are the weakest (Stein and Stanford, 2008), these principles play an important role 
in the construction and maintenance of a stable perception of the world.  
1.3 THE REPRESENTATION OF PERIPERSONAL SPACE 
Several regions have been identified in the (non-human) primate brain that are related to the 
neuronal integration of cross-modal signals originating from the body. These neuronal 
populations integrate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals and have been found in the 
putamen (Graziano and Gross, 1993) and the premotor (Graziano et al., 1997; Rizzolatti et 
al., 1981) and posterior parietal cortices (ventral intraparietal area, VIP, and area 7B) 
(Avillac et al., 2007; Graziano, 2000), all of which receive convergent inputs from primary 
sensory areas (Figure 1) and have strong anatomical interconnections. Intriguingly, 
populations of neurons in these regions do not only represent the body itself but also 
respond to visual (and sometimes also auditory; see Graziano et al., 1999) stimuli that 
originates within the space surrounding the body—the region constituting the so-called 
peripersonal space (Brozzoli et al., 2014). Single-unit recordings in macaques have 
identified trimodal neurons that have visual receptive fields (RFs) that extend up to 40 cm 
from a tactile RF (Fogassi et al., 1996), follow changes in limb position (Graziano, 1999) 
and are independent of the direction of gaze (Graziano and Gross, 1998). Thus, the visual 
RFs of these neurons are spatially anchored to the limb (Graziano, 1999). Collectively, 
these neuronal populations build representations of the body and its surrounding 
peripersonal space and encode objects close to the body in body-centered spatial reference 
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frames (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002). One might ask why such a representation would be 
adaptive. One possible reason comes from invasive studies performed in macaques 
demonstrating that neurons in the VIP and the polysensory zone (PZ) in the premotor 
cortex respond selectively to stimuli signaling a potential threat to the body surface. In fact, 
electrical microstimulation of the same cortical regions evoke movements that are typical of 
defensive reactions (Cooke et al., 2003; Graziano and Cooke, 2006). The multisensory 
representation of peripersonal space is thus considered to be important for defensive 
behavior, the sensory guidance of limb movements and the localization of body parts 
(Brozzoli et al., 2014; Graziano, 1999; Graziano and Botvinick, 2002). 
 
Figure 1. Multisensory regions in the macaque brain in which neurons that integrate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive 
signals within peripersonal space have been identified. Adapted from Graziano et al (2004). 
The evidence for a similar representation of peripersonal space in humans is primarily 
based on results from neuropsychological studies of patients with deficits caused by brain 
lesions (Brozzoli et al., 2014; Làdavas and Farnè, 2004). For example, it has been shown 
that spatial neglect – the failure to perceive stimuli originating from the contralesional 
space – can selectively affect the space near or far from the body (Cowey et al., 1994; 
Halligan and Marshall, 1991). Furthermore, cross-modal extinction – the failure to perceive 
a sensory stimulus originating from the contralesional space when a stimulus for another 
sensory modality is presented in the ipsilesional space – can specifically affect the space 
close to the patient’s body (di Pellegrino et al., 1997). In healthy individuals, similar cross-
modal interference effects specific to the near-personal space have been found using so-
called visuo-tactile congruency tasks (Holmes et al., 2004; Serino et al., 2011; Spence et al., 
2004a, 2004b), providing further support for the existence of a special representation of 
peripersonal space in humans. Thus, even though a wealth of research suggests that 
Ventral intraparietal area (VIP)
(on floor of sulcus)
Polysensory zone (PZ)
in premotor cortex
7B
Putamen
(subcortical)
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peripersonal space has a very special representation in the brain, from a phenomenological 
point of view, the space close to our hands does not “feel” different than the space outside 
our reach, and none of the experimental paradigms listed above provide a mechanism by 
which a patient or participant could consciously perceive a specific perceptual “object” that 
corresponds to visuo-tactile integration in peripersonal space. In Study II of this thesis, we 
characterize a new perceptual illusion in which healthy participants perceive a “magnetic 
force” between the surface of a rubber hand and an object moving in empty space above it, 
and we provide converging behavioral evidence for the notion that this illusion constitutes a 
perceptual correlate of visuo-tactile integration in peripersonal space (see Section 5 for 
details). 
Numerous neuroimaging studies in humans provide evidence for the convergence of visual, 
tactile, and proprioceptive stimuli onto fronto-parietal and subcortical regions (Beauchamp 
et al., 2010; Gentile et al., 2011; Hadjikhani and Roland, 1998; Huang et al., 2012; Lloyd et 
al., 2003; Makin et al., 2007; Saito et al., 2003; Sereno and Huang, 2006), which are 
thought to be homologous to the multisensory areas VIP, 7B, and PZ in the monkey brain 
(Figure 1; although it should be noted that direct inter-species comparisons should be 
interpreted with caution; see Grefkes and Fink, 2005; Culham and Valyear, 2006). 
However, it has remained unclear whether the integration of visual-tactile-proprioceptive 
stimuli in these areas follows the spatial and temporal rules of multisensory integration, 
which prompted us to conduct Study I of this thesis (see Section 5). A few studies have 
provided evidence for the existence of a representation of perihand space (Brozzoli et al., 
2011, 2012; Makin et al., 2007). The most convincing demonstration of this was conducted 
by Brozzoli & Gentile and colleagues, who found that the repeated presentation of an object 
close to one’s hand, as opposed to “far” from the hand but still within reach, is associated 
with an increase in fMRI-adaptation in the intraparietal and premotor cortices and the 
putamen (Brozzoli et al., 2012). This fMRI-adaptation was independent of the position of 
the hand, as if a visual RF were anchored to the limb. These results suggest that 
multisensory premotor, intraparietal and putamen regions preferentially respond to visual 
stimuli close to one’s hand, effectively encoding the location of objects within the 
peripersonal space in hand-centered spatial reference frames (Brozzoli et al., 2012). 
In summary, a wealth of research has demonstrated that a specific set of brain regions, 
namely, the premotor and intraparietal cortices and the putamen, integrate multisensory 
stimuli from the body and its surrounding (peripersonal) space. Because the peripersonal 
space represents a multisensory boundary zone between the body and the external world, it 
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has been suggested that the neuronal machinery underlying the representation of this space 
might also be involved in the self-attribution of one’s limbs. Two separate lines of research 
are especially relevant to testing this hypothesis: the study of patients with neurological 
impairments in their normal sense of limb ownership following brain lesions and the study 
of dynamic changes in the sense of limb- and full-body ownership using perceptual 
illusions in healthy participants.  
1.4 DISORDERS OF BODY OWNERSHIP 
The notion that the feeling of body ownership is a central construct that depends on intact 
neural circuitry in specific brain regions is not new. In 1942, neurologist Josef Gerstmann 
reported two cases of patients with lesions of the right hemisphere who suffered, in addition 
to the well-known motor and somatosensory deficits, from delusional beliefs that the limbs 
on their left side were not part of their own bodies; a syndrome he named 
somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942). Somatoparaphrenia has been described in numerous 
studies since and is characterized by delusional beliefs concerning the contralesional side of 
the patient’s body, most commonly manifesting as disownership of the limbs on the left 
side (e.g., the opening quote from one of Oliver Sacks’ patients) (Arzy S et al., 2006; 
Feinberg et al., 2010; Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). This experience of 
disownership persists despite providing evidence to the patients that suggests otherwise, 
which distinguishes somatoparaphrenia from the related syndrome asomatognosia 
(Critchley, 1953; Feinberg et al., 2010; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). Somatoparaphrenia is 
often but, importantly, not always accompanied by motor and somatosensory deficits, as 
well as hemispatial neglect (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). The neuroanatomical basis for 
somatoparaphrenia and other related syndromes has been difficult to determine with great 
precision because of the substantial variation in the location of the lesions across studies. 
Limb disownership has been associated with lesions in the frontal, temporal, and parietal 
lobes (Feinberg et al., 2010; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009), as well as with damage in 
subcortical structures such as the posterior insula (Baier and Karnath, 2008) and basal 
ganglia (Halligan et al., 1993). However, the somatoparaphrenia is much more likely to 
manifest after right-brain lesions (Blanke, 2012; Feinberg et al., 2010; Vallar and Ronchi, 
2009). In fact, one study using injections of amobarbital in the right carotid artery, which 
results in the temporary inactivation of the entire hemisphere, reliably induced 
somatoparaphrenia in 82% of the patients (Meador et al., 2000).  
The existence of somatoparaphrenia suggests that a functioning sense of body ownership 
requires intact neural processing in the above-mentioned circuits. However, the most 
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informative results for understanding the mechanisms by which the brain attributes 
ownership sensations to limbs come from the study of perceptual body illusions in healthy 
participants. 
1.5 FROM SINGLE LIMB- TO FULL-BODY ILLUSIONS 
In 1998, psychologists Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen re-discovered an old magic 
trick in which healthy participants are made to feel that an artificial hand is part of their 
own body (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). To induce this illusion, the participant observes a 
rubber hand being touched in synchrony with identical touches applied to their real hand, 
which is hidden from view behind a screen. This procedure creates an illusion that the 
applied touches are felt on the rubber hand and that the rubber hand is suddenly part of 
one’s own body, while the real hand fades from consciousness. They named this 
phenomenon the “rubber hand illusion,” and this experimental paradigm has become an 
important tool for investigating the mechanisms underlying the sense of body ownership 
over the past two decades. A wealth of behavioral and psychophysiological evidence, 
primarily from subjective questionnaires, skin conductance responses (SCRs) evoked by 
physical threats toward the rubber hand, and pointing errors in intermanual pointing tasks 
(see Section 4 for details), suggests that the illusion results from the integration of visual, 
tactile and proprioceptive signals in hand-centered reference frames within the peripersonal 
space (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010). It has been shown 
that to elicit the illusion, the visual stimulation of the rubber hand and the tactile stimulation 
of the real hand must be temporally synchronous (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et 
al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), and the stimuli must be applied in the same 
directions in hand-centered coordinates (Costantini and Haggard, 2007). In addition, and 
the rubber hand needs to be spatially matched with the real hand in terms of laterality 
(Holmes et al., 2006; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2008), anatomical 
orientation (Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000; 
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), and visual appearance (e.g., the illusion cannot be elicited 
using a block of wood) (Haans et al., 2008; IJsselsteijn et al., 2006; Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010). The rubber hand must also be placed within the theoretical 
limits of the peripersonal space of the real hand (Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013). In 
accordance with these behavioral results, which suggest that ownership of the rubber hand 
is a consequence of multisensory integration, functional brain imaging studies have found 
that the illusion is associated with increased activity in multisensory areas in the premotor 
and posterior parietal cortices (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005, 2007; Limanowski and 
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Blankenburg, 2015), with the magnitude of the neural response in the ventral premotor 
cortex (PMv) best reflecting the subjective sense of ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004). 
Notably, this set of areas is analogous to the regions in which multisensory neurons 
associated with the peripersonal space have been identified in the macaque brain, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that multisensory integration within the peripersonal space is 
a mechanism underlying body ownership (Makin et al., 2008). In Study I, we extended and 
validated these results for the real hand by showing that decreased multisensory congruence 
leads to a stronger sense of hand disownership, which is reflected in a corresponding 
decrease in neural activity in multisensory regions. Furthermore, the results of Study III 
challenge the claim that an object with a limb-like appearance is necessary for eliciting 
illusory ownership by characterizing a counter-intuitive illusion in which multisensory 
stimulation leads to the perception of having an invisible, “phantom-like” hand. 
Previous studies have shown that multisensory ownership illusions are not limited to single 
limbs and that they can be extended to an entire artificial body, commonly referred to as 
“full-body illusions” (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 
2008; Petkova et al., 2011a). In one such illusion, referred to here as the “mannequin 
illusion,” the participants observe a mannequin’s body being touched by an object through 
a set of head-mounted displays (HMDs) while receiving correlated tactile stimulation on 
their real body. This procedure results in the illusory experience that the mannequin is one’s 
own body (Maselli and Slater, 2013; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), which is reflected by 
increased neural activity in the same set of multisensory areas that are involved in the 
rubber hand illusion (Petkova et al., 2011a). In addition to following the same spatial and 
temporal multisensory congruence rules that govern the rubber hand illusion, the successful 
elicitation of the mannequin illusion is dependent on viewing the artificial body from the 
first-person visual perspective (Petkova et al., 2011a, 2011b). Interestingly, the specific 
body part of the mannequin that is stimulated (arm, belly, or foot) does not matter, since 
behavioral and neuroimaging results show that the ownership illusion “spreads” across 
body segments (Gentile et al., 2015; Petkova et al., 2011a). Phenomenologically, this 
finding is consistent with the notion that our sense of full-body ownership is a coherent 
unified experience rather than the sum of ownership-sensations over individual limbs and 
body parts. 
In what way are these perceptual body illusions relevant to the main goal of this thesis, 
namely, investigating the relationship between the senses of body ownership and self-
location? One way is illustrated by a particularly interesting full-body illusion, the so-called 
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“out-of-body illusion” (Ehrsson, 2007), in which the spatial context of the illusory body is 
experimentally manipulated. This offers a way to study the link between bodily and spatial 
self-perception. In this experiment, the participants sit on a chair and wear a set of HMDs. 
Through the HMDs, they view a real-time 3-D video feed from a pair of cameras located 2 
m behind their backs (Figure 2). To induce the illusion, the experimenter synchronously 
touches the participant’s chest, which is hidden from view, and the space just below the 
field of view of the cameras with two identical small rods. This mode of visuo-tactile 
stimulation leads to the illusory experience of being physically located at the position of the 
cameras, which is supported by questionnaire data and by SCRs evoked by threatening the 
“illusory body” with a sledgehammer (Ehrsson, 2007). Crucially, the delivery of 
asynchronous touches significantly reduces the vividness of the illusion, allowing for the 
comparison of otherwise equivalent conditions (Ehrsson, 2007). In Study IV, we 
reproduced and extended the results of Ehrsson (2007) by quantifying the effect of the 
illusion on spatial self-perception using a behavioral self-location task and examining how 
the illusory experience affects the representation of the seen real body. In Study V, we 
adapted the out-of-body illusion for use in an MRI scanner and studied the neural interplay 
between the senses of body ownership and self-location. The results of Study V are relevant 
to the literature on representations of the spatial environment in the brain, which, 
historically, has focused mostly on spatial navigation in animals, virtual navigation during 
neuroimaging in humans, and a limited number of case reports on out-of-body experiences 
(OBEs) in patients. 
 
Figure 2. Experimental setup of the out-of-body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007). 
Displays
The participant
The illusory body
Displays Video cameras
The experimenter
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1.6 THE SENSE OF SELF-LOCATION AND ITS RELATION TO BODY 
OWNERSHIP 
We do not experience our body in isolation from its spatial environment. We experience the 
body as a physical entity with a specific location in the external space, and we perceive the 
world from within our bodies, from a spatial origin located within the skull at some 
distance behind the eyes. The mechanisms by which the brain builds and maintains this 
fundamental subjective experience of being located somewhere in space have long been a 
central topic of discussion for philosophers and psychologists. In the late 1800s and early 
1900s, Ernst Mach emphasized the importance of our first-person visual perspective 
(Figure 3; Mach, 1903), which was later reiterated in the works of James Gibson (Gibson, 
1986). However, they provided little empirical support for these claims. What if the first-
person visual perspective could be experimentally changed—for instance, let us assume 
that the output signals from my retina could be wirelessly transmitted to your optical 
nerve—would your sense of self-location be instantly transferred to mine? Would your 
brain assume ownership over my body, from which you now view the world? These 
previously hyothetical questions have only recently become accessible to experimental 
psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists with the advent of advanced virtual and video 
reality technology and human brain imaging methods. Nevertheless, the basic mechanisms 
by which the brain represents the spatial environment have been a lively topic of research in 
neuroscience for almost half a century, probably due in large part to an unexpected 
discovery of specific neurons in the hippocampus of freely moving rats. 
 
Figure 3. “Picturing the Visual Field” by Ernst Mach (Mach, 1903). 
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In 1971, neurophysiologists John O’Keefe and Jonathan Dostrovsky published a seminal 
paper in which they described neurons in the rat hippocampus that fired when the animal 
occupied a particular location in a spatial environment (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971). 
The activity of these neurons, appropriately named “place cells,” was GPS-like; they fired 
at a given spatial location regardless of the rat’s head orientation or visual input. It was 
therefore proposed that the hippocampus is involved in building a cognitive map of the 
spatial environment, in which the individual’s location is represented in an allocentric (i.e., 
with respect to external or world-based coordinates) fashion (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). 
The behavioral advantage of this representation was later demonstrated in the famous 
Morris water maze experiment, in which hippocampal lesions resulted in dramatically 
impaired performance in a task where freely swimming rats tried to find a hidden platform 
that could normally be located using memory of spatial landmarks (Morris, 1981; Morris et 
al., 1982). These results suggest that the spatial representation in the hippocampus plays a 
role in facilitating ecological behaviors such as spatial navigation and memory (Andersen, 
2007). In addition to place cells, other neurons coding for different aspects of spatial 
localization have been identified, the most important being the “grid cells” in the entorhinal 
cortex (Hafting et al., 2005) and the “head-direction cells” in the subiculum (Chen et al., 
1994; Sargolini et al., 2006). One of the main functions of this neuronal machinery in the 
medial temporal lobe is considered to be the support of “path integration,” which refers to 
the process of keeping track of the individual’s position in the environment by integrating 
linear and angular self-motion cues (Moser et al., 2008) (i.e., the brain mechanism that 
allows you to keep track of your spatial location if you were to close your eyes and walk 
around in the room you are currently in). Over the recent decades, a large body of research 
in multiple species, including humans, has shown that the hippocampus plays an important 
role in episodic and spatial memory (Burgess et al., 2002; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), 
spatial navigation (Hassabis et al., 2009; Howard et al., 2014; Maguire et al., 1997), and 
spatial mental imagery (Lambrey et al., 2012; Marchette et al., 2014). 
In addition to the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, a number of regions that are 
anatomically highly interconnected with the medial temporal lobe (Kravitz et al., 2011) 
have been shown to play important roles in building a representation of the spatial 
environment. These include posterior midline structures such as the precuneus, the 
retrosplenial (RSC) and posterior cingulate cortices (PCC), and the intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) (Burgess, 2008; Maguire et al., 1998; Moser et al., 2008). Studies on spatial memory 
and navigation have shown that the human brain uses both egocentric (i.e., body-centered 
spatial coordinates) and allocentric representations of space and that regions in the medial 
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temporal lobe contribute primarily to allocentric representations, parietal areas contribute to 
egocentric representations, and the posterior cingulate cortex seems to be involved in 
transitioning between the parietal egocentric and medial temporal allocentric reference 
frames (Burgess, 2006, 2008; Vann et al., 2009). 
The vast majority of neuroimaging studies in humans have been based on virtual 
navigation, mental imagery, or spatial memory tasks. A few of these studies have 
specifically examined representations of self-location. For instance, two studies decoded 
the target locations in a virtual navigation task and found significant activity in the 
hippocampus and the posterior parietal region (Hassabis et al., 2009; Rodriguez, 2010). 
However, it remains unclear how these spatial representations relate to the perceptual 
experience of self-location and how they interact with the multisensory representations of 
one’s own body. Important clues related to this question can be found in the literature on 
OBEs of neurological origin. Studies of patients suffering from focal epilepsy or 
undergoing electrical brain stimulation during neurosurgery have shown that abnormal 
activity in the temporal and parietal areas, most commonly in the posterior superior 
temporal and angular gyri, can sometimes result in the experience of seeing one’s body and 
the world from a location outside the physical body, which defines an OBE (Blanke, 2012; 
Blanke et al., 2002, 2004, 2015; Brugger et al., 1997; De Ridder et al., 2007; Heydrich and 
Blanke, 2013). In addition to a change in the origin of their visuo-spatial perspective, these 
patients almost invariably report some type of vestibular sensation, such as rotating in space 
(Blanke et al., 2004). Interestingly, a previous fMRI study using a perceptual illusion in 
healthy participants based on visuo-tactile stimulation examined the interaction between 
self-location and the perceived directionality of the first-person visual perspective and 
presented evidence for the involvement of the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
(Ionta et al., 2011). However, this study did not specifically address the interplay between 
the senses of ownership and self-location, and studies on lesions are seldom informative 
with respect to the underlying perceptual mechanisms because the lesions are typically 
large and damage multiple areas of interest along with the underlying white matter. In 
Study V, we investigated the relationship between representations of self-location and body 
ownership by making use of an out-of-body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007). The behavioral results 
from Study IV demonstrate that the manipulation of visuo-tactile synchrony results in 
predictable changes in the senses of ownership and self-location. Specifically, synchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation was associated with a strong sense of ownership of the new 
“illusory body,” disownership of the seen real body, and a strong sense of self-location at 
the position of the cameras, whereas asynchronous stimulation was coupled with a 
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decreased sense of ownership of the new “illusory body,” less disownership of the real 
body, and a strong sense of self-location at the actual position of the physical body (Figure 
2). These behavioral properties of the out-of-body illusion, in conjunction with the 
observation that the strength of the ownership and self-location illusions varied across 
participants (Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012), allowed us to examine the neural activity 
related to ownership and self-location and the interaction between these perceptions in 
Study V.
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2 AIMS 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of multisensory integration in 
generating the feeling that the body is part of the self (body ownership) and the experience 
of being located in a given position in the environment (self-location). 
2.1 STUDY I AIM 
• Study I examined whether specific multisensory regions in the human brain integrate 
visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals from one’s real hand according to basic 
multisensory integration principles relating to spatial and temporal congruence and 
how this integration process relates to the default feeling of limb ownership. 
2.2 STUDY II AIM 
• Study II aimed at elucidating the relationship between multisensory integration within 
peripersonal space and the sense of limb ownership by studying a new perceptual 
illusion that allows healthy participants to experience an illusory magnetic force in the 
space close to an artificial hand. 
2.3 STUDY III AIM 
• Study III investigated the role of vision in bodily self-attribution. Specifically, this 
study characterized a novel perceptual illusion in which healthy participants are made 
to experience an invisible hand as part of themselves, challenging the assumption that 
visual input from a limb-like object is necessary for inducing changes in the sense of 
limb ownership. 
2.4 STUDY IV AIM 
• The goal of Study IV was to estimate the effects of the out-of-body illusion on the 
sense of self-location and feelings of (dis)ownership of the seen real body.  
2.5 STUDY V AIM 
• Study V aimed at characterizing the neural correlates of full-body ownership, the 
sense of self-location, and their functional interplay. Specifically, we used the out-of-
body illusion to perceptually teleport participants during high-resolution brain 
imaging and employed a multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to decode their 
perceived self-location from neural activity patterns across the whole brain. 
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3 METHODS  
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 360 healthy human volunteers participated in the Studies I-V. All participants 
were naïve to the purpose and specific hypotheses of the experiment in question. Informed 
consent was obtained prior to the experimental sessions. The Regional Ethical Review 
Board of Stockholm approved all of the experimental procedures. 
3.2 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Arguably, the most direct method of quantifying conscious experiences are verbal reports 
by the subjects themselves. In Studies I-V, we quantified the subjective experiences 
associated with the illusions under investigation by using questionnaires that were 
presented at the end of each experimental condition. In the brain imaging experiments in 
Studies I, III, and V, in which each experimental condition was repeated multiple times 
during the scanning sessions, we administered the questionnaires immediately after the 
conclusion of the brain imaging acquisition in a separate session in which we repeated each 
condition once. The design of the questionnaires was based on the original rubber hand 
illusion study (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), which has been widely used and validated in 
studies of body ownership illusions (Ehrsson, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ionta et al., 2011; 
Longo et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). In general, the 
participants were asked to affirm or deny different statements reflecting potential perceptual 
effects using a seven-point Likert scale that ranged from -3 to +3. The participants were 
informed that -3 indicated “I completely disagree,” +3, indicated “I agree completely,” and 
0 indicated “I do not know, I can neither agree nor disagree.” Half of the statements were 
designed to probe the perceptual effects of the illusion in question (referred to as “illusion” 
or “test” statements); the other half of the statements were used to control for suggestibility 
and task-compliance (“control” statements). By statistically analyzing the difference in 
ratings between the illusion and control statements and comparing this difference across 
conditions, we were able to achieve a robust estimate of the illusion-specific effects, 
correcting for the more general effects of suggestibility and task-compliance. 
Subjective evaluations are susceptible to task-compliance (the participants tend to report 
what they believe the experimenter wants them to report) and suggestibility (the behavior of 
the experimenter influencing the reports of the participants). To minimize these effects, we 
carefully designed the experiments and the questionnaires to include appropriate control 
statements, control conditions, and importantly, we always combined questionnaire data 
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with more “objective” behavioral measurements, such as the degree of proprioceptive drift 
or threat-evoked SCRs detailed below. The control statements were designed to be as 
semantically similar to the illusion statements as possible, but they described a perceptual 
effect that we did not expect to occur. The aim of the control conditions was to alter one 
key factor (e.g., the synchrony or spatial congruence of the seen and felt touches) that we 
hypothesized would be crucial for eliciting the illusion, while keeping all other 
experimental factors constant. 
3.3 PROPRIOCEPTIVE DRIFT 
One of the most commonly used behavioral proxies of ownership in the context of the 
rubber hand illusion is the so-called proprioceptive drift. This refers to the systematic 
pointing errors toward the position of the rubber hand that participants make when they are 
blindfolded after the illusion has been induced and are asked to point to where their hand is 
located using the contralateral hand (i.e., the hand that is not involved in the experiment). It 
has been shown that the classical rubber hand illusion is associated with a proprioceptive 
drift toward the location of the rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and 
Haggard, 2005) and that greater proprioceptive drift is associated with higher ratings of 
feelings of ownership for the observed hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005). However, recent studies have observed a dissociation between subjectively 
reported feelings of ownership and proprioceptive drift responses, suggesting that the two 
phenomena rely on separate underlying mechanisms (Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011). 
We used measurements of proprioceptive drift to provide additional behavioral evidence for 
the magnetic touch illusion in Study II and the invisible hand illusion in Study III. In both 
studies, each experimental condition was repeated three times. Between each period of 
stroking, there was a resting period of one minute. Immediately before and after each 
period of brushing, the participants were asked to close their eyes and indicate the position 
of their right index finger by pointing at it with their left hand (we always used a right 
rubber hand). Prior to obtaining this response, the experimenter placed the participant’s left 
index finger at one of three fixed starting points (the starting points were different for each 
repetition of a given condition, and the order was balanced across subjects) on a 1-m metal 
ruler (the ruler’s markings were visible only to the experimenter) positioned at a fixed 
distance above the table and in front of the participant’s body. Next, the experimenter asked 
the participants to move their finger briskly along the ruler (which contained a shallow 
groove) and stop when their finger was immediately above where they felt their right index 
finger was located. 
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In the statistical analyses, we computed the differences in pointing errors (toward the 
rubber or invisible hand) between the measurements obtained before and after each 
stimulation period. The average of these differences over the three repetitions constituted 
the proprioceptive drift for a given experimental condition within each participant. We 
analyzed the differences between conditions at the group-level by comparing the mean 
proprioceptive drift values between the conditions of interest using paired t-tests or 
repeated measures ANOVAs when the data were parametrically distributed and Wilcoxon-
signed rank tests or Friedman tests when the data were non-parametrically distributed. 
3.4 THREAT-EVOKED SKIN CONDUCTANCE RESPONSES 
An established psychophysiological proxy of illusory body ownership is the threat-evoked 
SCR. The use of this measure is based on the assumption that if an artificial limb is truly 
incorporated into one’s body representation, an increased fear response should be occur 
when viewing the now self-attributed limb being subjected to a physical threat, such as a 
needle penetrating the skin (Ehrsson et al., 2007), the rubber finger being bent backwards 
(Armel and Ramachandran, 2003), or a knife sliding over the rubber hand (Guterstam et al., 
2011, 2013). In fact, increased threat-evoked SCRs have been observed in numerous studies 
of limb- and full-body illusions, and this measure has therefore emerged as a reliable index 
of feelings of body ownership (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2007; 
Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012; Guterstam et al., 2011; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2009). 
Viewing a self-attributed artificial limb being threatened is also associated with increased 
BOLD responses in regions of the brain related to fear processing and pain anticipation 
(Ehrsson et al., 2007), which the fMRI results from Studies I and V in the current thesis 
confirmed. In Studies I, III, IV, and V, we applied physical “threats” to the illusory body 
or limb (in Study IV and V, we also threatened the seen real body to test for disownership) 
in the form of an approaching knife (in Study V, we also used a sledgehammer to threaten 
the visual representation of the real body), and we measured the brief increases evoked in 
skin conductance. In Study V, we also included a control threat in which we substituted the 
knife with a wooden kitchen spoon, which allowed us to exclude any effect of merely 
viewing an object moving within the near-personal space during an ownership-illusion. We 
always balanced the stimulation order and included appropriate control conditions so that 
we could relate changes in the SCR to changes in illusory ownership and exclude the effect 
of more general factors, such as surprise, general arousal or non-specific emotional 
responses related to the presentation of the knife. SCR values were recorded with a Biopac 
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System MP150 (Goleta, USA) following standard published guidelines (Dawson et al., 
2007). 
Care was taken to perform the same movements with the knife from trial to trial, i.e., 
controlling the velocity and acceleration of the movement. In the studies in which we used 
pre-recorded videos (Studies I and V), the threat events were identical. Before the 
experiments commenced, all participants were shown one example of a knife threat to 
ensure that the procedure was not perceived as too frightening and to reduce any effects on 
the SCR that were related to seeing the knife for the first time. In all of the SCR 
experiments outside of the fMRI scanner, each experimental condition was repeated three 
times, and there was a one-minute resting period between each period of stroking. In the 
fMRI experiments (Studies I and V), each condition was repeated multiple times. 
The threat-evoked SCR was defined as the peak in conductance that occurred within five 
seconds of the onset of the threat stimulus (i.e., from the first moment that the knife entered 
the participant’s visual field). The amplitude of the SCR was calculated as the difference 
between the maximum and minimum values of the identified response. The investigator 
performing the analysis was blind to the condition (i.e., illusion or control). The average of 
all responses for each participant, including those in which no increase in amplitude was 
apparent, was separately calculated for each condition, and this value was taken as the 
magnitude of the SCR (Dawson et al., 2007). Thereafter, the SCR magnitudes for all 
participants were compared statistically across the different conditions of interest. The 
participants who did not display any threat-evoked SCR in at least half of the trials were 
considered to be non-responders and were excluded from the analysis in Studies II and IV 
in accordance with previously published protocols (Guterstam et al., 2011; van der Hoort et 
al., 2011; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). The rationale behind this exclusion criterion was 
based on the theoretical argument that non-responders would “dilute” the data and decrease 
the signal-to-noise ratio. However, this exclusion also increases the number of assumptions, 
and the 50 percent cut-off value is arbitrary. In the subsequently published studies (I and 
V), we based our estimates on all of the participants including the so-called non-responders. 
In fact, this approach generated reliable threat-evoked SCRs related to changes in 
ownership, similar to the ones observed in the previous studies in which we employed the 
non-responder exclusion criterion.  
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3.5 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 
3.5.1 General methodological considerations 
In Studies I, III, and V, we examined the neural activity associated with the experimental 
conditions using fMRI. The signal protocol underlying fMRI was discovered in 1990 
(Ogawa et al., 1990), and soon thereafter, it became the most widely used functional brain 
imaging technique in humans. In contrast to other functional brain imaging methods such as 
PET and SPECT imaging, fMRI is non-invasive and does not require the administration of 
radioactive ligands or the exposure of the individual to ionizing radiation, which are 
associated with increased risks of cancer. The principle of fMRI is built on the so-called 
neurovascular reflex, which was originally proposed in 1890 by Roy and Sherrington: 
“The brain possesses an intrinsic mechanism by which its vascular supply can be varied 
locally in correspondence with local variations of functional activity.” (Roy and 
Sherrington, 1890) 
For instance, when you speak, neuronal populations in Broca’s area in your left prefrontal 
cortex increase their firing to perform the computations necessary to instruct your vocal 
muscles to produce the sound of the words, resulting in an increased demand for oxygen in 
this cortical region as the neurons consume more energy. Shortly after (approximately 0.5 
s) the increase in neuronal activity, the concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin therefore 
decreases, while the concentration of deoxygenated hemoglobin increases. However, the 
neurovascular reflex ensures that the local arterioles in Broca’s area dilate, leading to an 
increase in blood flow to this brain region. In fact, the increase in blood flow is 
supercompensatory, resulting in a relative increase in the concentration of oxygenated 
hemoglobin, which peaks 4-6 s after the initial neuronal activation. This initial short dip 
and subsequent supercompensation in blood oxygenation is called the hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). Because oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin have 
different ferromagnetic properties (diamagnetic versus paramagnetic), changes in their ratio 
affect the local homogeneity of the strong magnetic field inside an MR magnet, which can 
be detected with an MR machine by measuring the response to a radio frequency (RF) pulse 
using an RF coil placed around the participant’s head. This response signal is called the 
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response, and it allows researchers to obtain a 
snapshot of the cerebral blood flow distribution every 2-3 s across the whole brain at a 
spatial resolution of 2-3 mm3 three-dimensional pixels, referred to as voxels. One can thus 
detect the changes in the BOLD signal over time, which constitute an indirect measure of 
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electrical neural activity due to the neurovascular reflex (Goense et al., 2012; Logothetis et 
al., 2001). 
Whereas fMRI has been very useful for examining the neural correlates of perceptual, 
sensory, and task-rated effects, it has several important limitations. In the following 
paragraphs, I will discuss a few of the methodological issues related to fMRI that need to be 
addressed when acquiring and statistically analyzing fMRI data, and how we corrected for 
these issues in the studies included in this thesis. 
One important methodological consideration is the issue of head movement. If the 
participant makes drastic head movements during the scanning, the voxels will not align 
with the same corresponding brain tissue throughout the experiment, resulting in a violation 
of one of the basic principles of the statistical analysis of fMRI data (namely, that one given 
voxel corresponds to the neural activity in one given volume of brain tissue). To remedy 
this problem, we instructed the participants to keep their head and body as still as possible 
throughout the experiments. In addition, we fixed each participant’s head in the head coil 
using foam pads and pillows to help them keep their heads still. Furthermore, the fMRI 
analysis software package we used (SPM8, Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, UK) employs a motion 
correction algorithm as part of the preprocessing of the data. This algorithm performs better 
when the head motion is continuous than when it is abrupt, and when the movement is, as a 
rule of thumb, of a magnitude less than the voxel size of the fMRI protocol. The most 
detrimental type of head motion is task-related head motion (e.g., if the participant nods 
every time a stimulus of interest is presented). To ensure that this was not the case in our 
studies, we always inspected the estimated realignment parameters. Figure 4 shows the 
average motion parameter estimates (±standard deviation) for all of the participants in the 
two experiments in Study I, showing that head motions were well within the safety limits. 
We did not need to exclude any participants from the fMRI studies due to excessive head 
movement or task-related head motion. 
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Figure 4. Head motion parameters for the two experiments included in Study I. The average motion in the x, y, and z 
directions, and well as the estimated rotational motion (red=Pitch, blue=Roll, green=Yaw)  
Another major challenge with fMRI relates to the individual differences in brain anatomy. 
To make group-level inferences about changes in activity in a specific brain region, it is 
necessary to align the corresponding cortical areas across participants. To this end, we used 
the brain normalization algorithm featured in SPM8, which normalizes each individual 
brain to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard brain. This procedure allowed 
us to compare results across participants and studies using spatial coordinates in a 
standardized space. 
3.5.2 Preprocessing of the fMRI data 
In all studies, we analyzed the fMRI data using SPM8. The first three volumes of each run 
were discarded from further analysis due to non-steady-state magnetization. Following slice 
timing correction, the functional images were realigned to correct for head movements (see 
above) and co-registered with the high-resolution structural scan of each participant (3-D 
MP-RAGE sequence, 1 mm3 voxel size). The anatomical image was subsequently 
segmented into white matter, gray matter, and cerebrospinal fluid partitions, and it was then 
normalized to the MNI standard brain. 
3.5.3 Univariate fMRI analyses 
For the univariate analyses in Studies I, III, and V, the functional images were normalized 
to the MNI standard brain and spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel. In the first-level analysis we defined 
separate regressors for each main experimental condition, one regressor for the threat 
events (Studies I and V), and one regressor-of-no-interest to model the catch trials. Each 
condition was modeled with a boxcar function and convolved with the standard SPM8 
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hemodynamic response function. We defined linear contrasts using a general linear model 
(GLM) to test our hypotheses, and the contrast images from all subjects were entered into a 
random effects group analysis (second-level analysis). 
3.5.4 Multivariate fMRI analyses 
For the multivariate analyses in Study V, we analyzed the functional data in native space and 
performed spatial smoothing using a 3-mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian kernel in SPM8. We 
defined separate regressors for each block of stimulation and each experimental condition. 
The resulting maps of the parameter (beta) estimates were used as the MVPA input. Within 
each participant, we used local multivariate mapping to identify multivoxel patterns (the so-
called “searchlight” approach) (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). The brain was partitioned into 
overlapping voxel clusters, and in each of these clusters, we used linear support vector 
machines (SVMs) with the fixed regularization parameter of C=1 to compute the decoding 
accuracies for the analyses of interest. The experimental design was optimized for an SVM 
decoding analysis, in contrast to alternative MVPA approaches such as representational 
similarity analyses (Vass and Epstein, 2013), because the SVM decoding approach allows for 
more exploratory whole-brain analyses (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) and the direct use of the 
asynchronous condition as a rigorous control for visual input. We used a ten-fold leave-one-
run-out cross-validation approach to ensure independent training and testing data. For details 
about the MVPA, see the supplementary material for Study V. 
3.5.5 Effective connectivity analyses 
In Studies I, III, and V, we evaluated changes in the degree of neural connectivity using 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses. The PPI measures context-induced changes 
in the strength of connectivity between two brain regions, as measured by a change in the 
magnitude of the linear regression slope that relates their underlying activities. A significant 
PPI indicates that the contribution of one area to another changes significantly with the 
experimental or psychological context (Friston et al., 1997). In our analyses, we assessed 
connectivity changes between a pre-defined seed region and the rest of the brain. Specifically, 
the seed was defined for each subject and consisted of the peak voxel within a 10-mm radius 
from the group peak coordinate in a main analysis of interest (e.g., in Study V, we defined 
the seed based on the main self-location decoding contrast). Having identified the subject-
specific seed coordinates, we extracted the time series (first eigenvariate) of activity from the 
seed and adjusted for effects of no interest, such as head motion parameters, threat events, 
and catch trials. In all of the studies, we sought to examine ownership-related changes in 
connectivity, and therefore performed a PPI analysis using the contrast of synchronous versus 
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asynchronous as the psychological factor. At the individual level, three regressors were 
created in a GLM that represented the time course of activity in the seed region (the 
physiological factor), the psychological factor, and their product (the PPI). In Study V, the 
parameter estimates for the PPI regressor from each participant were entered into a second-
level analysis using the decoding accuracy in the seed region (one per participant) as a 
covariate. We then analyzed the contrast estimates for the covariate by using a one-sample t-
test. Notably, by estimating the covariate (which was derived from the MVPA analysis) and 
not the PPI regressor itself, any voxel revealed by this analysis reflects ownership-related 
connectivity increases (i.e., increased connectivity in the synchronous condition across 
position) that significantly scaled with the self-location decoding accuracy in the PCC. This 
analysis brought together the univariate GLM findings related to the feeling of ownership of 
the stranger’s body and the multivariate decoding results related to the representation of the 
perceived self-location. As such, this effective connectivity analysis allowed us to examine 
the interplay between the neural representations of the body and the perceived self-location. 
3.5.6 Accounting for the problem of multiple comparisons 
The analysis of fMRI data faces a massive problem of multiple comparisons because one 
human brain consists of hundreds of thousands of voxels, and standard statistical methods 
perform the same analysis for each and every voxel (the so-called massive univariate 
approach) (Friston et al., 1995, 1997). However, every well-designed fMRI study has 
specific neuroanatomical hypotheses, and in the analyses of interest, it would be overly 
conservative to correct for all the voxels in the brain (including those representing white 
matter) or in regions outside the regions-of-interest (ROIs). There are several ways to 
define ROIs, such as using MNI coordinates from previous studies, anatomical masks, or 
functional localizers. In our studies, we combined an exploratory approach with stricter 
criteria for statistical significance (whole-brain corrections for multiple comparisons) with a 
hypothesis-driven approach using small-volume corrections based on coordinates from 
previous studies.  
First, all of our fMRI analyses were performed using the whole brain as the search space. 
For exploratory purposes, we first thresholded the resulting whole-brain activation maps at 
an uncorrected threshold. For the appropriate statistical inferences, we then performed 
correction for multiple comparisons using the family-wise error (FWE) correction, with a 
threshold of P<0.05 corrected as the statistical criterion for significance. For the brain 
regions for which we had a priori neuroanatomical hypotheses, we corrected for multiple 
comparisons using small-volume corrections (SVCs) within spheres centered on the 
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activation peaks derived from previous relevant studies. For the rest of the search space, we 
corrected for the total number of voxels in the whole brain. Importantly, both approaches 
result in adequate corrections for multiple comparisons. In Study III, we observed 
extremely strong levels of activation in the a priori hypothesized regions that survived 
corrections for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level, and we therefore reported the 
whole-brain statistics in this study. 
For activations that were located outside the regions for which we had a priori 
hypotheses—and that did not survive the whole-brain correction for multiple 
comparisons—we report the T-value, MNI peak coordinate, and the uncorrected P-value in 
a purely descriptive manner (see supplementary tables). This procedure is common practice 
and ensures a description of the activation maps that is unbiased with respect to a priori 
hypotheses. These results can contribute to the generation of new hypotheses for future 
studies and are relevant with respect to the issue of null-effects and the question of the 
anatomical specificity of the observed effects. The sections displayed in the figures always 
represent the whole-brain activation map, which has been thresholded at an uncorrected 
level for display purposes only. This brain mapping approach has been used in many 
previous publications from our group (Brozzoli et al., 2011, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Gentile et al., 2011, 2013; Petkova et al., 2011a) and from other groups (Mobbs et al., 2007; 
Singer et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007). 
It is worth emphasizing that we did not use a conventional ROI approach. The conventional 
ROI approach involves pre-defining search volumes based on neuroanatomy or 
independent functional imaging results (functional localizers). Typically, the mean 
activation of the whole ROI is extracted and evaluated via a univariate analysis, while 
multivariate analyses typically involve the training and testing of a classifier on all of the 
voxels within the ROI. In these cases, one usually adopts the rather liberal threshold of an 
uncorrected P<0.05 for the ROI, making it necessary to perform a correction for multiple 
comparisons when a large number (typically > 4) of ROIs are studied. Thus, the 
conventional ROI approach only involves corrections for multiple comparisons based on 
the number of ROIs tested. In contrast, the voxel-based brain mapping approach that we 
employed in the studies included in this thesis involves corrections for multiple 
comparisons across all the voxels within the appropriate search space, be it a predefined 
small volume or the whole brain. Similarly, for the multivariate analyses in Study V, we 
used the standard “Searchlight” approach (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006), in which a classifier is 
trained and tested within a subset of voxels (a 3-mm-radius sphere) centered around a given 
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voxel. This process is then repeated for all of the voxels in the whole brain, thus generating 
whole-brain decoding maps that are fed into conventional second-level random effect 
analyses in SPM8. In the analysis of the decoding maps, we used small-volume-corrections 
to control for the problem of multiple comparisons in the whole-brain data in the same 
manner by which the univariate analyses were performed and evaluated. 
There are several advantages to using a whole-brain voxel-wise approach compared to 
standard ROI approaches. First, voxel-wise peak statistics provides higher anatomical 
specificity because information about the topology of the activation maps, which is lost 
when averaging the BOLD signal across an entire ROI, is retained. Second, a whole-brain 
approach allows for the detection of unexpected activations outside the regions for which 
one has a priori hypotheses. This typically leads to a more accurate and transparent 
characterization of the findings from neuroimaging experiments. For these reasons, we 
chose a combination of voxel-wise SVCs for activations in the anatomical regions for 
which we had a priori hypotheses and reported the uncorrected P values for activations 
outside these regions using a purely descriptive approach.  
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4 MAIN RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the following section, I briefly summarize the main findings and conclusions of the 
individual studies. For details, I refer the reader to the full manuscripts attached at the end 
of this thesis. 
4.1 STUDY I 
The goal of Study I was to determine whether neuronal populations in the premotor, 
parietal, and cerebellar cortices integrate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals from the 
hand according to basic temporal and spatial congruence principles of multisensory 
integration. Neurophysiological studies in monkeys have shown that these areas perform 
visuo-tactile-proprioceptive integration (Graziano, 1999; Hyvärinen and Poranen, 1974; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1981), and neuroimaging studies in humans using the rubber hand illusion 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004) suggest that this integration process might underlie our sense of limb 
ownership. However, it remains to be shown whether this integrative process obeys basic 
multisensory congruence rules for the real hand in humans, and if it is relevant for the 
default feeling of limb ownership. To address these questions, we developed a setup based 
on 3-D video technology that allowed us to manipulate the spatiotemporal relationships of 
the visuo-tactile (VT) stimuli delivered to a participant’s real hand during fMRI and to 
investigate the ensuing neural and perceptual correlates. The participants were positioned 
inside the scanner in a posture with their head tilted and looking into a set of HMDs in 
which they observed their real right hand in 3-D being touched by an object (see Figure 5). 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the temporal synchrony and spatial congruence (spatial 
incongruence consisted of seeing the back of the hand being stroked, but feeling a stroke on 
the index finger, or vice versa) of the seen and felt touches. In Experiment 2, we 
manipulated the temporal synchrony and visuo-proprioceptive congruence of the stimuli, 
such that in half of the trials, the seen position of the arm did not match the felt position of 
the arm (i.e., the participant’s hand was retracted). To assess the sense of ownership of the 
virtual representation of the seen limb, we used a combination of post-scan questionnaires, 
threat-evoked SCRs and BOLD-responses during the scanning sessions.
 
Figure 5. Experimental setup of Study I. The positioning of the participant in the scanner is shown on the left, and the 
stereoscopic visual stimuli is shown on the right.  
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The experiments revealed two main findings. First, the results of Experiment 1 show 
responses in the premotor, parietal, and cerebellar regions that were dependent on the 
spatial and temporal congruence of VT stimuli (Figure 6A). The results of Experiment 2 
demonstrate that this multisensory integration effect requires a simultaneous match between 
the seen and felt postures of the hand (Figure 6B), which suggests that congruent visuo-
proprioceptive signals from the upper limb are essential for successful VT integration. 
Second, we observed that multisensory conflicts significantly disrupted the feeling of 
ownership of the seen real limb, as quantified by complementary subjective questionnaire 
responses, threat-evoked SCRs, and BOLD-signal responses (Figure 6C). Furthermore, the 
degree to which self-attribution was impaired could be predicted from the attenuation of 
neural responses in key multisensory areas. Together, the results of Study I shed light on 
the neural basis of the integration of multisensory hand signals in accord with basic 
spatiotemporal congruence principles, and they demonstrate that the disintegration of these 
signals leads to feelings of “disownership” of the seen real hand. Thus, these findings 
suggest that not only feelings of ownership of artificial limbs but also the default feeling of 
ownership of one’s real limbs is dependent on basic multisensory integration principles. 
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Figure 6. Study I results. A. Temporal and spatial VT congruence was associated with significantly increased activity in the 
premotor, posterior parietal, and cerebellar regions. B. The VT integration response in this set of areas was dependent on the 
congruence between the seen and felt position of the arm (visuo-proprioceptive congruence). C. The magnitude of the BOLD 
response in the premotor and lateral occipital cortices correlated significantly with the threat-evoked SCR, which is a well-
established proxy of limb ownership (see Section 4.3). 
 
4.2 STUDY II 
Study II aimed to elucidate the relationship between multisensory integration within the 
peripersonal space and the sense of limb ownership by characterizing a novel perceptual 
illusion: the “magnetic touch illusion.” This rather unexpected illusion demonstrates that it 
is possible to induce ownership of a rubber hand without actually touching its surface. In 
this case, the illusion was elicited by applying brushstrokes in mid-air at some distance 
above the hand (Figure 7A). Intriguingly, this mode of stimulation resulted not only in the 
illusory experience of owning the rubber hand but also in the perception of a “magnetic 
force” or “force field” between the brush and the rubber hand. In a series of eight 
experiments, we used a combination of questionnaires, proprioceptive drift measurements, 
and motion tracking of the brush in mid-air to systematically examine the hypothesis that 
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this illusory magnetic force reflected multisensory integration mechanisms operating in 
peripersonal space. As mentioned in Section 1.3, trimodal peripersonal space neurons 
characterized in macaques have specific RF properties, namely, they feature visual RFs that 
extend up to 40 cm from a tactile RF (Fogassi et al., 1996), follow changes in limb position 
(Graziano, 1999) and are independent of the direction of gaze (Graziano and Gross, 1998). 
Our results show that in each of the questionnaire-based experiments (Experiments 1a, 1b, 
2a, and 3a), the magnetic touch sensation correlated strongly with the reported sense of 
rubber hand ownership. Furthermore, the magnetic touch sensation exhibited a nonlinear 
decline in illusory strength at approximately 40 cm (Experiment 1a; Figure 7B), which was 
independent of gaze direction (Experiment 1b). We also found that “tactile expectations” 
(Ferri et al., 2013) elicited by merely observing an object moving near the hand did not 
contribute to the illusion (Experiment 2a and 2b) and that the perceived magnetic force did 
not penetrate physical barriers (Experiment 3a and 3b), thus further linking this 
phenomenon to the multisensory body representation. In Experiment 4, we combined 
motion tracking with a continuous real-time assessment of the strength of the illusion to 
map out the extension of the magnetic touch illusion in 3-D space for two different rubber 
hand positions and found that the illusion volume was spatially anchored to the rubber hand 
(Figure 7C-D). Together, these findings led us to propose that the illusory sense of 
magnetic touch constitutes a perceptual correlate of visuo-tactile integration in peripersonal 
space. Furthermore, the results provide strong support for the notion that multisensory 
integration within peripersonal space is key for the emergence of body ownership. 
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Figure 7. Results of Study II. A. Experimental setup of Experiment 1A and 1B. Mid-air brushstrokes were performed at 
different distances from the rubber hand as indicated (5 cm-55 cm). B. The mean ratings of the sensations of magnetic touch 
and rubber hand ownership. In both cases, there was a non-linear decline in the strength of the illusion between the distances 
35 cm and 45 cm. C. In Experiment 4, we mapped out the 3-D spatial extension of the illusion for two different rubber hand 
positions. To this end, we synchronized motion tracking of the brush moving in mid-air (in 17 different directions) with real-
time ratings of illusion vividness. Here, we show all the data from one individual participant, in which each spatial 
coordinate is color-coded according to the reported subjective strength of the magnetic touch sensation. D. By extrapolating 
the data, we were able to map the illusion volumes for each of the two rubber hand positions, the result of which clearly 
demonstrate that the illusion volume follows changes in rubber hand position. 
 
4.3 STUDY III 
The goal of Study III was to examine the role of vision in the multisensory process of self-
attributing limbs. Specifically, we undertook a systematic investigation of a novel 
perceptual illusion, which we named the “invisible hand illusion,” demonstrating that it is 
possible to elicit ownership sensations of a discrete volume of empty space. In essence, we 
adopted the classical rubber hand illusion paradigm but removed the rubber hand and, 
instead, applied the brushstrokes in empty space, “painting the contours” of an invisible 
hand. The results show that within a short period of brushing, participants started to refer 
the sensation of touch to empty space and also experienced having an invisible hand in this 
position. By evaluating questionnaires and measuring proprioceptive drift, threat-evoked 
SCRs, and BOLD responses in a total of 234 participants, we showed that the invisible 
hand illusion follows the same perceptual rules as the rubber hand illusion and is associated 
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with increased activity in premotor and intraparietal multisensory regions (Figure 8). The 
illusion was dependent on the application of temporally synchronous and spatially 
congruent (with respect to hand-centered reference frames and within near-personal space) 
brushstrokes in mid-air and on the hidden real hand. In short, these results demonstrate that 
multisensory integration can result in the perception of a phantom-like invisible limb and 
that the visuo-tactile integration mechanisms in the premotor-intraparietal regions that 
underlie changes in limb ownership are not dependent on visual input from a limb-like 
object. 
 
Figure 8. FMRI setup and results of Study III. A. Experimental setup used to induce the illusion within the constrained 
scanner environment, as observed from the outside (left) and from the participant’s perspective inside the magnet (right). B-
C. Significant activations in the ventral and dorsal premotor cortices (PMv/d), the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the anterior 
insula (AIC), reflecting the experience of having an invisible hand. All activation maps correspond with the contrast 
synchronous versus asynchronous (p<0.05, corrected), which was masked inclusively with the contrast synchronous versus 
spatially incongruent (p<0.001, uncorrected), a control condition in which the brushstrokes were applied synchronously but 
in opposite directions. The plots display the parameter estimates for the synchronous, asynchronous, and spatially 
incongruent conditions for the main areas of interest. The peak coordinates are reported in MNI space. Error bars denote the 
SEM. 
 
4.4 STUDY IV 
Study IV investigated the effect of the out-of-body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007) on the subjects’ 
perceived self-location and the sense of (dis)ownership of the real body viewed from a 
third-person perspective. To estimate the effect on perceived self-location, we induced the 
illusion using the application of synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation for one min, after 
which we administered a behavioral self-location task. In this task, we asked participants to 
rate how strongly they perceived themselves to be located in two candidate positions: at 
their veridical location in the chair and at the location of the cameras (Figure 9A). We used 
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation as the control condition. The results show that 
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participants in the synchronous condition reported a strong sense of self-location at the 
cameras and a weak sense of self-location at their veridical self-location (Figure 9C). In the 
asynchronous condition, the participants reported a strong sense of self-location at their 
veridical location and only a weak sense of self-location at the position of the cameras 
(Figure 9C). Thus, by manipulating the temporal congruence of the seen and felt touches on 
the body, we were able to change the perceived self-location in a predictable and controlled 
manner. 
 To test for potential effects of disownership of the seen real body, we measured the SCR 
evoked by a knife approaching the participants back after a period of synchronous or 
asynchronous stimulation (Figure 9A, cut-in frame). In the synchronous condition, we 
observed a significantly lower threat-evoked SCR than in the asynchronous condition, 
which is consistent with the notion that the real body is disowned during the out-of-body 
illusion and no longer perceived as part of the self. In a control experiment, we substituted 
the participant’s body with a “stranger’s body” and performed the same knife threatening 
procedure (Figure 9B). The results show no significant difference in threat-evoked SCR 
(Figure 9D), suggesting that differences in the SCR observed in the main experiment were 
indeed related to perceptions of seeing the knife approaching one’s real body and not any 
nonspecific reduction of the SCR related to changes in visuo-spatial attention while 
experiencing the illusion. 
In summary, the behavioral results of Study IV show that the out-of-body illusion can be 
used to induce predictable changes in perceived self-location and body ownership. These 
findings encouraged us to undertake Study V, which involved adapting the illusion for use 
in the MRI scanner. 
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Figure 10. Setup and results of Study IV. A-B. The experimental setups of the main experiment (panel A) and the control 
experiment (panel B). The knife-threat procedure is illustrated in the sample frame in the lower left corners. C. Results of the 
self-location task. D. Results of the threat-evoked SCR, showing decreased stress responses to real body threats during the 
synchronous illusion condition compared to the response in the asynchronous control condition. These results suggest that 
the real body is disowned during the out-of-body illusion. 
 
4.5 STUDY V 
Study V investigated how the brain represents one’s own body with respect to the spatial 
environment. To this end, we adapted the out-of-body illusion to the constrained 
environment of an MRI scanner and studied 15 healthy participants. By using MRI-
compatible HMDs, pre-recorded 3-D videos custom-edited for each participant, and 
multisensory stimulation, we induced the out-of-body illusion for different spatial locations 
in the actual scanner room (Figure 11A). To induce the illusion, the participants viewed a 
stranger’s body being touched by an object from the first-person perspective while 
receiving tactile stimulation on the corresponding parts of their real body (they observed 
their real body lying in the scanner from a third-person perspective). Again, asynchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation was used as the control condition because the results of Study IV 
show that this mode of stimulation reliably reduces the strength of the self-location and 
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body ownership illusions. During the course of the experiment, we induced the illusion in 
several different locations (for simplicity, only positions A and B are discussed here), 
effectively “teleporting” the participants perceptually, while their brain activity was 
recorded using fMRI. 
The behavioral and psychophysiological results (i.e., threat-evoked SCR, post-scan self-
location task and “body ownership” questionnaire results) agreed with the findings of 
Study IV, showing that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation was associated with an 
unambiguous sense of self-location in the out-of-body position and a strong sense of 
ownership of the stranger’s body. In the asynchronous condition, the participants had a 
stronger sense of being located at their veridical location inside the magnet and experienced 
less ownership of the stranger’s body. Furthermore, when contrasting the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions across spatial locations, we found significantly stronger activity 
levels in key multisensory areas that have previously been found to be associated with 
illusory full-body ownership (Figure 11B) (Petkova et al., 2011a). Thus, these results 
demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. 
To identify neural activity patterns that reflected the sense of self-location, we used MVPA 
to decode positions A versus B in the synchronous condition, using the asynchronous 
condition as a control for effects not specific to the illusion, such as visual input. We found 
significant decoding of self-location in the hippocampus, PCC, and IPS (Figure 11C). 
Interestingly, the decoding accuracy in the PCC and IPS scaled significantly with the 
subjectively reported self-location scores (Figure 11D), suggesting that activity patterns in 
these areas reflect one’s subjective sense of self-location. 
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Figure 11. Setup and results of Study V. A. Overview of the scanner environment (upper panels) and a sample frame of the 
visual stimuli (lower panels) for positions A and B. B. Illusory ownership of the stranger’s body was associated with 
increased activity in key multisensory regions. C. Significant decoding of self-location was observed in the hippocampus, 
posterior cingulate cortex, and the intraparietal sulcus. D. The decoding accuracy in the retrosplenial cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex, and intraparietal sulcus significantly scaled with the behavioral self-location scores. L = left. R = right. 
We investigated the interplay between the neural representations of body ownership and 
self-location by performing an analysis of effective connectivity. In brief, we first identified 
the PCC as a candidate key node in combining these two representations because previous 
studies have shown that the PCC is involved in translating spatial reference frames 
(Burgess, 2008), and PCC activity in our study both decoded self-location and significantly 
scaled with behavioral self-location scores. We then searched for areas showing increased 
connectivity to the PCC in relation to experiencing ownership of the stranger’s body (i.e., in 
the synchronous condition) that scaled with the self-location decoding accuracy in the PCC. 
The results show that the higher the self-location decoding accuracy in the PCC the 
stronger the ownership-related connectivity was to the hippocampus, retrosplenial cortex 
and the IPS.  
In summary, the findings of Study V are consistent with the notion that the PCC plays a 
key role in integrating the senses of self-location and body ownership, and show that the 
hippocampus, IPS, and PCC are not only involved in supporting ecological behaviors such 
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as spatial navigation and memory, but are also important for the perceptual experience of 
being physically located in a specific location in the environment. 
 
Figure 12. Results of the effective connectivity analysis examining the interplay between neural representations of body 
ownership and self-location. IPS=intraparietal sulcus. RSC=retrosplenial cortex. HC=hippocampus. 
  
Ef
fe
cti
ve
 co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
to
 P
CC
 (a
.u
.)
-0.4
0
0.4
L. HC [-24 -18 -16]
Δ Decoding accuracy
in PCC (%)
P = 0.003, corrected
-10 0 10
R. RSC [4 -54 20]
P = 0.021, corrected
Ef
fe
cti
ve
 co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
to
 P
CC
 (a
.u
.)
-0.4
0
0.4
L. IPS [-40 -52 42]
P = 0.023, corrected
Ef
fe
cti
ve
 co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
to
 P
CC
 (a
.u
.)
-0.4
0
0.4
  45 
5 DISCUSSION 
How does the brain combine signals across sensory modalities to build and maintain a 
coherent representation of the bodily self in space? The experiments included in this thesis 
show that basic multisensory congruence principles can be used to manipulate specific 
aspects of body ownership and self-location in a controlled and predictable manner. By 
using various behavioral measurements and functional brain imaging, we characterized the 
perceptual rules and the neural correlates of these manipulations of bodily and spatial self-
perception. It must be noted that we are not the first to propose that multisensory 
integration is involved in building internal representations of the body. Decades of 
neurophysiological research on non-human primates have demonstrated that specific brain 
regions merge sensory signals across modalities and construct higher representations of the 
body (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002). However, because non-human primates cannot report 
their subjective experiences, the results of these experiments tell us little about the neural 
foundations of bodily and spatial perceptions in humans. To address these questions, a great 
deal of research over the past two decades has focused on body ownership illusions such as 
the rubber hand illusion, the results of which are consistent with the notion that ownership 
of an artificial limb or full-body relies on multisensory integration of signals originating 
within the near-personal space (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Makin et al., 2008). Each of 
the studies included in this thesis aimed at filling a knowledge gap or challenging an 
assumption made in the literature. In Study I, we demonstrate that the spatial and temporal 
multisensory congruence principles that have previously been shown to govern the 
perception of an artificial limb as belonging to the self also determine the default sense of 
ownership of one’s real hand. Furthermore, our fMRI results show that this multisensory 
integration process is implemented by fronto-parietal-cerebellar circuits, which is consistent 
with the findings from single-cell recordings in non-human primates (Graziano and 
Botvinick, 2002). In Study II, we report a new perceptual effect consisting of the illusory 
experience of a magnetic force between a brush moving in mid-air at some distance above a 
rubber hand. This magnetic touch sensation was strongly correlated with feelings of rubber 
hand ownership and exhibited striking similarities to the RF properties of peripersonal 
space neurons, providing strong support for the notion that multisensory integration within 
peripersonal space is intimately involved in the sense of body ownership. The results of 
Study III, in which we characterized the invisible hand illusion, show that correlated 
dynamic visuo-tactile signals are more important than the mere visual input from a limb-
like object in the process of attributing limbs to the self, suggesting the need for an update 
of previous proposals in the literature regarding the role of vision in bodily self-attribution 
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(Tsakiris et al., 2010). In Studies IV and V, we examined the role of multisensory 
integration in the process of constructing a coherent, unified perception of one’s body in 
space. The behavioral results of Study IV show that the out-of-body illusion (Ehrsson, 
2007) can be used to elicit predictable changes in feelings of full-body ownership and the 
sense of self-location. Importantly, our findings demonstrate that a change in first-person 
visual perspective in conjunction with temporally congruent tactile stimulation is sufficient 
to induce a change in perceived self-location; however, if the tactile stimulation is 
asynchronous, participants report that their self-location is unaltered. We made use of this 
observation in Study V, in which we adapted the out-of-body illusion to the MRI 
environment and used it to perceptually “teleport” participants between different spatial 
locations while undergoing fMRI. We employed MVPA to decode perceived self-location 
(using the asynchronous condition as the control for visual input) and found significant 
decoding in the hippocampal, posterior cingulate, and intraparietal areas. Furthermore, the 
results of an effective connectivity analysis using the PCC as the seed region, found that 
this region is involved in integrating representations of body ownership and self-location. 
Together, the results of Studies I-V go beyond earlier work on body illusions because they 
provide unprecedented support for the notion that multisensory integration within the 
peripersonal space is key for the self-attribution of real and artificial limbs, and they reveal 
a dynamic interaction between fronto-parietal representations of body ownership and 
parieto-cingulate-hippocampal representations of self-location, in which the PCC might 
play an integrative role. 
What do the results of this thesis tell us about the multisensory mechanisms that underlie 
feelings of body ownership and one’s sense of self-location in the environment? In Study 
V, we found that illusory ownership of a stranger’s body viewed from the first-person 
perspective was coupled with increased activity in the premotor, intraparietal, and lateral 
occipital cortices and that the magnitude of the BOLD response in the left PMv scaled 
significantly with the reported strength of the illusion. These results are consistent with the 
fMRI findings of Study I and III, which investigated ownership of a virtual representation 
of one’s real hand or the perception of having an invisible hand, and with the results of 
previous studies on single-limb (Brozzoli et al., 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004) and full-body 
ownership (Gentile et al., 2015; Petkova et al., 2011a). As previously mentioned, studies in 
macaques have shown that the premotor and intraparietal cortices feature neuronal 
populations with visuo-tactile RFs covering the skin surface and its immediate surrounding 
space (Graziano, 1999, 2000; Graziano et al., 1997; Rizzolatti et al., 1981), which 
collectively represent a multisensory buffer zone between the body and the environment. In 
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addition, these neurons have the capacity to integrate spatiotemporally congruent visual, 
tactile, and proprioceptive signals from the body (Avillac et al., 2007; Gentile et al., 2011, 
2013; Graziano, 1999). Together, these properties make the IPS and PMv ideal candidates 
for mediating feelings of body ownership (Brozzoli et al., 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Makin et 
al., 2008). The existence of the magnetic touch phenomena detailed in Study II, in 
conjunction with the results of a recent study that revealed BOLD-adaptation responses in 
the IPS and PMv specific to visual stimulation close to a self-attributed rubber hand 
(Brozzoli et al., 2012), suggests that the observed activity in premotor-intraparietal regions 
reflects the remapping of the peripersonal space onto a body part perceived as belonging to 
the self. Furthermore, Study I shows that premotor-intraparietal activity reflects the 
integration of spatiotemporally congruent visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information 
from the seen upper limb (consistent with the results of Gentile et al., 2011) and that this 
multisensory integrative activity is intimately related to the sense of limb ownership. 
Moreover, the unified experience of owning an entire body, as demonstrated in the full-
body illusion featured in Study V, has been associated with the integration of visual and 
tactile signals across multiple body segments in the same set of fronto-parietal areas 
(Gentile et al., 2015; Petkova et al., 2011a). In light of these findings, I propose that 
feelings of body ownership are reflected in two closely related processes implemented by 
neuronal populations in the premotor-intraparietal cortices: the remapping of peripersonal 
space from being centered on the real body to being centered on an artificial body and the 
integration of visuo-tactile-proprioceptive information in body-centered spatial reference 
frames. This idea is in accordance with the decrease in SCRs (observed in Study IV and V) 
and BOLD activity in cortical regions related to pain anticipation and fear processing 
(Study V) in response to threats directed toward the seen real body, indicating that 
ownership of an illusory body is associated with the disownership of the real body. 
One might rightfully ask how this rather complicated system for bodily self-attribution 
could have evolved? I speculate that the system for establishing a multisensory peripersonal 
space initially evolved in response to the ecological need to efficiently reach and grasp 
near-by objects (Graziano, 1999, 2001; Graziano and Botvinick, 2002) and to defend one’s 
body from physical harm (Cooke et al., 2003; Graziano and Cooke, 2006). Because this 
multisensory system represents a swift and relatively accurate way of distinguishing the 
body from external objects, it might have been “recycled” by our perceptual systems for the 
purpose of assigning ownership sensations to limbs in accordance with the neuronal 
recycling hypothesis (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007). This interpretation fits well with the 
notion that the feeling of ownership reflects the affective significance of the body to the self 
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and that it is grounded in a specific type of body schema dedicated to bodily protection (de 
Vignemont, 2015) (see Section 1.1). The multisensory peripersonal space representation in 
the PMv is an ideal candidate for harboring this proposed “protective body schema” 
because it is involved in planning protective movements, and the neural activity in the PMv 
is tightly linked to the subjectively reported vividness of body ownership sensations (unlike 
activity in the IPS, LOC, or the cerebellum). Future studies using the magnetic touch 
illusion to quantify ownership sensations and map out the extent of the peripersonal space 
around artificial limbs, real limbs, tools, and even the limbs of other people might shed 
light on the relationships between the representation of the peripersonal space, the sense of 
limb ownership, and our sense of the affective significance of seen limb-like objects. 
In the process of localizing one’s own body with respect to the surrounding spatial 
environment, the brain needs to combine information concerning the representation of the 
body – processed via multisensory peripersonal space mechanisms in the IPS and PMv – 
with information concerning self-location, which the decoding results in Study V suggest is 
encoded in parieto-cingulate-hippocampal regions. In Study V, we hypothesized that the 
PCC plays a central role in this integrative process based on its strong anatomical 
connections to both intraparietal and medial temporal areas (Kobayashi and Amaral, 2007) 
and its involvement in processing transformations between body-centered and allocentric 
spatial reference frames, which has been observed in studies of spatial perception and 
navigation (Burgess, 2008; Epstein, 2008; Kravitz et al., 2011). Indeed, the effective 
connectivity results in Study V show that the higher the self-location decoding accuracy in 
the PCC the stronger its ownership-related connectivity to regions in the IPS and the 
hippocampus, which is consistent with the hypothesized integrative role of the PCC. 
However, it should be noted that the involvement of other areas in this process cannot be 
ruled out, such as the posterior parietal cortex, which has been implicated in numerous 
studies of spatial navigation and mental imagery (Maguire et al., 1998; Rodriguez, 2010; 
Spiers and Maguire, 2007; Zacks and Michelon, 2005) and in which we observed an 
overlap between the self-location decoding cluster and the body ownership activation 
cluster (see Supplementary Figure 4E in Study V). 
It is interesting to speculate in what way, if any, the mechanisms underlying the out-of-
body illusion under investigation are similar to the ones responsible for OBEs of 
neurological origin (see Section 1.6). In OBEs described by patients, focal epilepsy or 
electrical brain stimulation induce the sensation of viewing one’s body and the world from 
a location outside the physical body, coupled with vestibular sensations such as floating, 
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flying, elevation, and rotation (Blanke et al., 2004; De Ridder et al., 2007; Penfield and 
Erickson, 1941). Out-of-body illusions and clinical OBEs share the characteristic that the 
perceived self-location is referred to an extracorporeal position. In contrast to OBEs, the 
participants experiencing the out-of-body illusion in Study IV and V denied feeling any 
type of illusory vestibular sensations. Interestingly, a previous fMRI study examining 
another full-body illusion (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) showed that the participants 
experienced illusory vestibular percepts in association with the illusion (Ionta et al., 2011). 
In this experiment, the participants were lying face up and observing, from a third-person 
perspective, the back of an avatar’s body being touched while they received synchronous 
tactile stimulation of their real backs, resulting in illusory changes in their perceived self-
location and feelings of looking upwards or downwards. The authors found evidence for the 
involvement of the bilateral posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG) in representing self-
location with respect to the perceived direction of the first-person perspective and the 
gravitational field (Ionta et al., 2011). Intriguingly, this cortical region shows a stronger 
correspondence to the areas in which electrical stimulation have been shown to induce 
OBEs in patients (the pSTG and angular gyrus) (Blanke et al., 2004) compared to the set of 
areas that we revealed in Study V. Therefore, I speculate that the pSTG and angular gyrus 
are involved in representing self-location with respect to the gravitational field (explaining 
why Study V, in which the participants denied feeling any illusory vestibular sensations, 
failed to find significant self-location decoding in these regions), while the parieto-
cingulate-hippocampal circuit identified in Study V is involved in representing self-location 
with three degrees of freedom (along the x, y, and z axis). The unified experience of being 
physically located in a given location with six degrees of freedom (i.e., x, y, z, pitch, roll, 
and yaw) might require an interplay between the TPJ and parieto-cingulate-hippocampal 
circuits. Moreover, it is interesting to consider the possibility that focal epileptic activity in 
the inferior parietal and superior temporal lobes in patients with neurological disorders 
(Blanke, 2012; Blanke et al., 2004, 2015) could be associated with the spread of abnormal 
neural activity to the parieto-cingulate-hippocampal areas, contributing to the false sense of 
self-location in OBEs of neurological origin. 
Neural activity related to illusory body ownership was also found in regions outside the 
posterior parietal and premotor cortices in the fMRI studies presented in this thesis, the 
most notable being in the LOC and the cerebellum. In Studies I, III, and V, we found 
robust activations in the bilateral LOC, corresponding well with the standardized 
coordinates of the extrastriate body area (EBA), which is involved in the visual processing 
of human limbs and body parts (Downing and Peelen, 2011; Downing et al., 2001). I 
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speculate that the bilateral LOC activity observed across the studies in this thesis represents 
an ownership-induced modulation of the processing of visual information from the artificial 
body, possibly reflecting top-down modulatory effects (Driver and Noesselt, 2008; 
Macaluso et al., 2000) on the LOC from the multisensory body representation in the IPS. 
This interpretation is in accordance with previous studies on limb ownership that have 
shown illusion-induced increases in connectivity between the LOC and the IPS 
(Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2015; Limanowski et al., 2014), and the observation that 
tactile, proprioceptive, and motor signals from a limb can modulate the processing of visual 
information from the same body part in the LOC (Astafiev et al., 2004; Costantini et al., 
2011; Orlov et al., 2010). Moreover, in Studies I and III*, we observed strong activations 
in a section of the lateral cerebellum that is anatomically connected to the posterior parietal 
and premotor cortices (Clower et al., 2001; Orioli and Strick, 1989). This region is involved 
in integrating visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals from the body (Dum et al., 2002) 
and is activated in the classical rubber hand illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005) and when 
temporally congruent visuo-tactile stimulation is delivered to a person’s real hand (Gentile 
et al., 2011). It is also considered to compute the temporal relationship between sensory and 
motor signals (Ito, 2000; Miall et al., 1993) and is involved in the generation of sensory 
predictions (Blakemore et al., 2001). I speculate that the cerebellar activations observed in 
Studies I and III reflect the neuronal computations underlying the generation of tactile 
predictions based on visual impressions from an object moving close to and about to touch 
an artificial limb that is perceived as part of the self. The observed increase in connectivity 
between the cerebellum and premotor-intraparietal cortices during the invisible hand 
illusion supports the notion that this cerebellar information is made available to the fronto-
parietal circuits responsible for establishing multisensory body representations. 
In all of the studies included in this thesis, we used the classical approach in psychology of 
studying perceptual illusions to understand how the brain’s normal perceptual processes 
work. A general limitation of this approach is that patterns of brain activation and 
behavioral/physiological responses (e.g., threat-evoked SCRs) observed in subjects while 
experiencing an illusion could potentially reflect nonspecific effects related to arousal or 
the experience of an unusual percept. For instance, it is theoretically possible that the 
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation used to induce the illusions in Studies I, III, IV, and 
V led to an increase in the level of attention paid to a certain portion of the visual field, 
which could potentially confound the analysis of illusion-related neural activation identified 
                                                
*All of the participants in Study V did not have cerebellar coverage due to the high-resolution, narrow field-of-
view fMRI protocol used, and activations in the cerebellum could thus not be examined in this study. 
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via BOLD responses or threat-evoked SCRs. However, we took several measures to 
exclude these potential confounders in our studies, and there are very strong arguments 
against a purely attentional explanation of our findings. First, we controlled for visuo-tactile 
synchrony in all of the studies by including appropriate experimental control conditions 
(e.g., temporally synchronous but spatially incongruent visuo-tactile stimulation), which 
excludes the possibility that visuo-tactile synchrony per se or associated attentional 
differences can explain the observed illusion-related BOLD-signal or SCR differences. 
Second, the experimenter who was manually delivering the stimuli ensured that the 
participants always kept their hands in a fixed position in all of the experimental conditions. 
The observation that there were no differences in hand movements between the illusion and 
control conditions is supported by the lack of any significant illusion-associated BOLD 
activity in primary motor areas in Studies I, III, and V. Third, there were no significant 
differences in eye movements across the conditions (see the eye-tracking results of Study 
V; Supplementary Figure 5), which would be expect had there been substantial differences 
in the where subjects were directing their attention between illusory and non-illusory 
conditions. Fourth, we observed significant correlations between neural and behavioral 
measures in all of the fMRI studies (e.g., between the magnitudes of BOLD responses and 
threat-evoked SCRs in Study I and between self-location decoding accuracy and reported 
self-location scores in Study V). These findings support the notion that the neural activity 
in our regions-of-interest were related to changes in the sense of ownership or self-location 
rather than to changes in attention brought about by the synchrony of the visual and tactile 
stimuli or to nonspecific effects of arousal. This is further supported by the results of Study 
I in which we found ownership-related BOLD activity in multisensory regions even though 
the experiment involved ownership of the participants’ real hand, which presumably 
constitutes a less exciting and unusual experience than ownership of an artificial hand. 
Finally, in Study I, we conducted a separate control experiment to specifically address the 
issue of attentional effects. Here, we employed an explicit visual attention task in the 
context of experiencing illusory ownership of a virtual hand elicited via synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation or in a non-illusory context in which the stimulation was asynchronous. 
The results show that the participants’ level of performance (P=0.59) and their reaction 
times (P=0.48) did not significantly differ between the synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions. In addition, the ownership-related BOLD-responses in multisensory regions 
were preserved in spite of the explicit attentional task being performed. Together, these 
findings suggest that experiencing body ownership illusions in general does not lead to 
impaired visual attention or shifts in attention to portions of the visual field that are not 
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subject to the visuo-tactile stimulation, and they suggest that nonspecific attentional effects 
or arousal do not explain the ownership-related patterns of brain activation observed in our 
fMRI studies. 
The results presented in this thesis are relevant to areas of research in applied neuroscience, 
in particular to the fields of neuroprosthetics and telepresence. One of the major goals in 
neuroprosthetics is to create artificial limb devices that not only move according to the 
user’s intentions and relay sensations of touch but also feel as though they were the user’s 
own limbs. Although previous studies on amputees have shown that it is possible to induce 
ownership of a prosthesis by using peripheral somatosensory stimulation, either in the form 
of tactile stimulation of the stump (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Schmalzl et al., 2011), a 
reinnervated patch of skin (Marasco et al., 2011) or, possibly, electrical stimulation of cuff 
electrodes chronically implanted in peripheral nerves (Ortiz-Catalan et al., 2014; Tan et al., 
2014), it remains unknown whether it is possible to elicit ownership sensations through 
electrical brain stimulation. The induction of ownership sensations via cortical stimulation 
would have important implications for the development of advanced prosthetics devices 
and exoskeletons based on brain-computer interfaces in patients who lack peripheral 
sensory input for reasons such as lesions of the spinal cord, peripheral nerves, or subcortical 
structures. Characterizing the neural correlates of limb ownership and the underlying 
psychological processes could facilitate the identification of suitable cortical targets for 
neural stimulation. Given the results of previous studies on the rubber hand illusion 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004) and those of Study I showing that 
ownership of an artificial limb as well as one’s real limbs depend on the integration of 
multisensory input in the premotor-intraparietal regions, I hypothesize that spatially and 
temporally congruent visual stimulation of an artificial hand and electrical stimulation of 
the primary somatosensory cortex can be integrated in these multisensory areas to create 
ownership sensations. This prediction presupposes a flexible model of multisensory 
integration for bodily self-attribution that allows crude electrically induced somatosensory 
signals to be integrated with natural high-quality visual signals from a rubber hand being 
touched. This supposition could potentially be tested using electrocorticographic 
stimulation. 
Another possible application of the present results is the development of enhanced virtual 
environments in which the user experiences ownership of a virtual body and a strong sense 
of presence (Slater et al., 2008, 2009). The development of such realistic virtual 
environments in combination with body ownership illusions could have relevant clinical 
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applications (e.g., treating social anxiety disorders [Guterstam et al., 2015b; Slater et al., 
2006], motor rehabilitation in neurological patients [Sveistrup, 2004], or enhanced control 
over surgical robots [Seymour et al., 2002]). Furthermore, characterizing the neural 
mechanisms underlying body ownership and self-location has important implications for 
the development of true telepresence—an interface that would allow the user to experience 
being physically located outside the real body in another part of the world—which could 
have relevant applications in education, communication, travel, and entertainment. 
In conclusion, this thesis sheds light on two fundamental aspects of bodily awareness: the 
process of attributing the body to the self (body ownership) and of representing the location 
of one’s body with respect to the environment (self-location). Together, the results of 
Studies I-V provide converging evidence for the notion that multisensory integration 
within the peripersonal space is key for the emergence of body ownership and establishing 
the sense of self-location. Increasing our understanding of the neural mechanisms 
underlying bodily and spatial aspects of the self is at the heart of cognitive neuroscience 
because these processes define the origin of the egocentric reference frame that is necessary 
for self-consciousness (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Vogeley and Fink, 2003) and our 
ability to interact with the outside world (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002).  
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